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A PENNY FOR YOUR ORGANS:
REVISING NEW YORK’S POLICY ON
OFFERING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR
ORGAN DONATION
David I. Flamholz∗
“The law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still.”1
INTRODUCTION
Across the nation, 89,498 people are currently on a waiting list
for suitable organs.2 In 2003 alone, close to 6,000 people died in
the United States while waiting for transplantable organs.3 That
breaks down to approximately sixteen people per day.4 The bottom
line is that demand for suitable transplant organs far exceeds the
supply. The state of New York has a major organ shortage crisis of
∗

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.A., Biology, Yeshiva University,
1998. The author would like to thank Professor Bailey Kuklin for his advice and
guidance, Amber Long for her input and editing, Professors Thomas J. Cossé
and Terry M. Weisenberger for making their research available for this paper,
and to the entire staff of the Journal of Law & Policy. Special thanks to his
parents, Joel and Sally Flamholz, for their continued support and
encouragement.
1
ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
2
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Data,
http://www.optn.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
3
Lawrence R. Reed, Encourage Organ Donors with a Little Quid Pro Quo,
U.S.A. TODAY, July 23, 2003, at 13A (approximating a “daily death toll that
adds up to about 6,000 a year.”). Cf. Paul Elias, Organ Need Spurs Talk of
Financial Incentives, THE DETROIT NEWS, available at http://www.
detnews.com/2001/health/0112/05/a04-357685.htm (Dec. 3, 2001) (citing a
figure of 15,000 people dying per year waiting for organ transplants).
4
Reed, supra note 3.
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its own. In New York there are currently 8,192 people awaiting an
organ donation.5 In light of these extenuating circumstances, it is
time for New York to follow the lead of the federal government
and the Pennsylvania state legislature, by reexamining its
opposition to the sale of human organs and adopting a policy of
offering indirect financial incentives,6 combined with a strict set of
guidelines. Establishing a program that offers indirect monetary
rewards to those who consent to volunteer their organs for
donation will increase the supply of organs in the state. Further,
following many of the guidelines established by the American
Medical Association (AMA) will enable New York to stay within
the legal and moral boundaries drawn by ethicists and lawmakers
over the past fifty years, and ensure that the ethical and health
concerns normally associated with compensation programs will be
addressed.
As organ replacement has evolved into an increasingly viable
option for individuals facing organ failure, both federal and state
legislators find themselves confronted with the difficult task of
satisfying two competing goals: the preservation of life and the
reduction of suffering on the one hand, and the preservation and
protection of the highest ethical and moral standards demanded by
American society on the other. Legislators realize that a strong
desire to take advantage of new technological advances which may
benefit the public must be tempered by recognizing that safeguards
and guidelines are necessary to ensure that society’s treasured and
respected convictions—such as integrity of the human body and
respecting deceased wishes—are not compromised.7
5

The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Overall by Organ,
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (data last updated Sept. 9, 2005).
6
Indirect financial incentives—as opposed to direct financial incentives—
offer compensation or discounts for various steps of the donation process
without offering compensation for the organ itself. See infra notes 157-159 and
accompanying text.
7
These issues have not been confronted in the United States alone. See
generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ORGAN
DONATION (1994) for a comprehensive compilation of government reactions to
the growing field of organ donation around the world.
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In consideration of those two competing goals, in 1984
Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act
(NOTA),8 which prohibits the transfer of human organs for
“valuable consideration” in inter-state commerce.9 The legislative
history of NOTA cites an insistence that human body parts should
never be viewed as commodities.10 Later, in 1987, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA),11 which encourages states
to prohibit the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration
within their own borders. New York had already passed its own
law to that effect in 1985, prohibiting the sale of human organs.12
The legislative history of New York’s statute cites a fear of
“widespread medical prostitution.”13
One unfortunate consequence of these forms of protective
legislation has been the elimination of a potentially valuable source
of useful organs—people willing to relinquish their organs in
return for some consideration. At present, not only does a shortage
of organs exist, but Congress has restricted the means of obtaining
those organs as well. A reassessment of the categorical ban on any
8

42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2001).
Id. Under the United States Constitution, Congress’s power to legislate is
limited to, among other things, those issues that affect interstate commerce. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Thus, under the National Organ Transplantation Act, Congress
was limited to banning the acquisition or receipt of human organs to instances
when it affects interstate commerce.
10
S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975,
3982.
11
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003).
12
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002).
13
1985 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, Memorandum of
Assemblyman Dennis T. Gorski 82 [hereinafter Memorandum of Assemblyman
Gorski]. Indeed, in the international community, organ trafficking is on the rise,
prompting a re-evaluation of international guidelines on the matter. See, e.g.,
Organ Trafficking and Transplantation Pose New Challenges, MEDICAL NEWS
TODAY,
available
at
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/newssearch.
php?newsid=13008 (Sept. 7, 2004) (suggesting that the World Health
Organization consider updating the guiding principles in the light of current
practices).
9
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type of organ commodification plan may therefore not only be
necessary, it may be unavoidable. Over a decade ago, medical
experts predicted that “[t]he growing numbers [of individuals]
waiting for cadaveric donations and the high costs of technology
such as dialysis . . . will force the issue of commercialization into
the national political arena in the future.”14 However, aside from
creating a commercial market for organs, other ethically and
legally feasible methods are available to increase organ donations.
As discussed in this Note, the method of offering modest and
indirect financial incentives to prospective donors is one
potentially effective way of increasing the supply of organs while
still retaining ethical responsibility and moral sensitivity.
Part I of this note discusses the medical history of organ
donation in the United States. Part II examines the organ shortage
crisis in the United States and the various hurdles facing legislators
who seek to remedy it. Part III delves into the various solutions
proposed to solve the crisis. Part IV introduces the financial
incentives solution to solve the organ donation crisis. Part V
discusses the state of New York’s policy on organ donation.
Finally, Part VI recommends a new method to procure organs in
New York that is based on Pennsylvania’s already successful
campaign to increase donor participation and consent. With this
new method, this Note hopes to encourage legislative reform to
increase the donor pool in New York, thereby alleviating much of
the unfortunate deficit for organs in the New York region.

14

Alex Guttman & Ronald D. Guttman, Sale of Kidneys for
Transplantation: Attitudes of the Health Care Profession and the Public, 24
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2108, 2108 (1992), cited in DAVID PRICE,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, 370-71 (2000).
These thoughts have more recently been echoed in an article in the American
Journal of Law and Medicine. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards:
Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized
Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 110 (1995) (“It is only a
matter of time before this country will be forced to decide on the type of
commercial system which should be adopted in order to meet the demand of
transplantable human organs.”).
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I. MEDICAL HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DONATION
The human species has attempted to replace organs and tissue
since ancient times. In fact the very first organ donor was none
other then the very first man—when Adam donated his rib to
contribute to the creation of Eve.15 Over the past few decades, the
skills and techniques used to perform organ transplants have
dramatically improved.16 This improvement has lead to a steady
annual rise in the number of transplants performed. For example,
the number of kidney transplants has greatly increased over the
previous quarter century. In 1982, only 5,358 kidney transplants
were performed in the United States, while in 1986, just four years
later, the number increased to 8,960.17 In 2003, 15,134 kidney
transplants were performed.18 The increasing number of kidney
transplants reflects the increase in technology and information
available regarding the performance of organ transplants to
patients facing organ failure.19 As technology has transformed
15

Genesis 2:21-22 (“And He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh
instead, thereof: And from the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man,
made He a woman.”).
16
Laurel R. Siegel, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation 49
EMORY L. J. 917, 918 (2000) (asserting that although the skills and techniques
have changed over the centuries, the goal of prolonging life in the event of organ
failure remains the same).
17
Robert Pear, U.S. Will Require Hospitals to Identify Potential Organ
Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1987, at 26. The kidney is by far the organ most
transplanted. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Transplants
by Donor Type, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (data last updated
Sept. 9, 2005) (showing that of the 25,466 organ transplants performed in the
United States in 2003, 15,134 of those were kidney transplants).
18
Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Transplants by Donor
Type, supra note 17.
19
See Sean Arthurs, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost
Model Congress Should Apply To Address the Abject Failure of Our National
Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2005) (citing Michael
Waldholz, Change of Heart: Transplant Pioneer Rejects Approach He Helped
Create, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003 at A1 (stating that the increase in transplants
from 12,000 in 1988 to 25,000 in 2002 is attributable to continual improvements
in medical and pharmacological technology)).
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organ transplantation into a medically feasible option, the need to
regulate the procurement and allocation of organs has become
more critical.
Although experiments in transplanting organs began as far
back as the middle ages,20 it is only in the past century that the idea
of transplanting organs from one human to another went from
being science fiction to a medical reality.21 In 1911, the first
human-to-human organ transplant, a testis allograft,22 was
performed in the United States.23 Unfortunately, it was only mildly
successful as the recipient retained testicular function for only
three weeks.24 Since then, numerous advances have been made in
the field of organ donation. The first heart transplant in the United
States took place in 1967.25 However, the patient only remained
alive for six and one half hours.26 Then, in the 1970’s, the
invention of the immunosuppressive drug, cyclosporine,
revolutionized the field by alleviating many of the problems
caused by transplant rejection.27 This invention, coupled with
various other advances in surgical techniques, led to an explosion
in the number of organ transplants in the 1980’s and 1990’s.28
Organ transplants throughout the rest of the world are also being

20

See Siegel, supra note 16, at 919 (discussing such things as tissue
replacements for facial defects in Italy and transplanting animal tissue in
Britain).
21
See
AUSTEN GARWOOD-GOWERS, LIVING DONOR ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION: KEY LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 17 (1999) (explaining that
early in the twentieth century scientists began experiments in taking an organ
out of one animal and placing it in another).
22
“An allograft is a graft (transplant) of material from the body of one
person (usually a dead person) to that of another person.” The Knee Guru,
Dictionary, http://www.kneeguru.co.uk/html/dictionary/allograft.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005).
23
Siegel, supra note 16, at 920.
24
Id. at 920 n.20.
25
Id. at 920.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 921.
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performed in record numbers.29 These advances in medicine have
not, however, completely solved the organ shortage problem.
II. THE ORGAN SHORTAGE CRISIS
Despite the great advances in transplant technology, the deficit
of transplantable organs grows every day. These technological
advances have now created a sad and frustrating irony. That is,
while the capability to safely transfer organs now exists, there are
simply not enough organs available to meet the growing demand.
As noted by Dr. Frank Riddick Jr., chairman of the AMA, a
“nationwide crisis” in the shortage of available organs for
transplants has developed, and a reliance on the low number of
altruistic organ donations is not enough to alleviate this crisis.30
New procurement strategies are needed to fill the gap between the
demand for organs and the supply. However, three obstacles have
stood in the way of the implementation of organ procurement
methods which would elicit a more adequate supply of organs: (1)
the inability to provide appropriate motivation to persuade people
to consent to donate either their own organs or those of their
deceased relatives; (2) ethical barriers which have made legislators
throughout the nation reluctant to enact innovative legislation
which would increase the number of organs available for
transplant; and (3) legislative reform in the past two decades which
has made it more difficult, for those in dire need, to obtain organs.

29

See Record Number of Organ Transplants Performed in the UK ,
MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/
medicalnews.php?newsid=13859 (Sept. 22, 2004) (“A total of 2,863 life-giving
transplants were carried out during 2003-2004 – the highest number ever
performed.”).
30
Elias, supra note 3. See infra Part II.A.1. The recognition of this “crisis”
has been the primary motivation for AMA to reconsider its refusal to conduct a
trial on financial incentives. Jim Warren, ASTS Ethics Committee Endorses Pilot
Program to Test a Financial Incentive to Increase Organ Donation, 11
TRANSPLANT NEWS 10 (May 28, 2002). See also infra Part IV.A.2.c. (discussing
the AMA’s new policy on financial incentives).
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A. Consent to Donate

One primary obstacle that has stood in the way of obtaining
more organs has been unwillingness on the part of healthy people
to consent to donate their organs or those of their deceased
relatives. One report predicts that relying on the altruism of the
American public to come forth and volunteer to donate their own
organs to help their fellow citizens in peril should on its own be
sufficient to deal with the shortage of organs.31 However, reliance
on altruism alone has thus far been unsuccessful. Less than 30% of
people dying with harvestable organs ever consented to donate
their organs.32 While the concept of organ donation has received
widespread approval,33 many people have been unwilling to step
forward and consent to donate their own organs.34 Both
31

In promoting the suggested ban on the sale or purchase of human organs,
the U.L.A. cites a Hastings Center Report which states:
Altruism and a desire to benefit other members of the community are
important moral reasons which motivate many to donate. Any
perception on the part of the public that transplantation unfairly
benefits those outside the community, those who are wealthy enough to
afford transplantation, or that it is undertaken primarily with an eye
toward profit rather then therapy will severely imperil the moral
foundations, and thus the efficacy of the system.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, Comment § 10, 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003).
32
Reed, supra note 3.
33
See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989) (citing a 1985
Gallup Poll indicating that seventy-five percent of American adults approve of
the concept of organ donation).
34
Id. (explaining that only twenty-seven percent were willing to donate
their organs upon death). See Siegel, supra note 16, at 944-45 (citing a number
of reasons why people might be reluctant to consent to donate their own organs).
See also Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric
Organ Donation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT
DEBATE 199 (Arthur C. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS] (suggesting that relying on altruism is a form
of imposing our own value system on those who may not share the same
thoughts or feelings about organ donation). For an analysis of the implications
of such a program, see John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant
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psychological and religious factors serve as barriers to voluntary
consent to organ donation.35 Such factors include: a religious belief
in sanctity of the human body;36 a desire not to have one’s remains
treated as mere carrion;37 and an unwillingness to contemplate
one’s own mortality.38
To further exacerbate the problem, the families of half of the
people dying with harvestable organs refuse to consent to donate
their deceased relatives’ organs, even when that decision goes
against the wishes of the deceased.39 For instance, in 2004 the New
York Organ Donor Network received 55,571 hospital referrals for
organ donations in the Greater New York Metropolitan Area.40
However, only 654 of the families of potential organ donators were
approached, and only 308 consented to donate their family
member’s organs upon death.41 This consent rate of 47% is below
the national average of 55%.42 Every day the unfortunate gap
between patients in desperate need of organs and donors
consenting to donate their own or their deceased family member’s
organs widens.
This gap is unfortunate because as many people die awaiting
organs, many medically qualified donors die without taking any
steps to donate their organs.43 With the existence of modern
Program: When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
197, 214-19 (1994). See also Orly Hazony, Increasing the Supply of Cadaver
Organs for Transplantation: Recognizing that the Real Problem is
Psychological Not Legal, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 219 (1993).
35
Cohen, supra note 33, at 8-11.
36
Id. at 9.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 10
39
Id.
40
New York Organ Donor Network, Organ and Tissue Donation,
http://www.donatelifeny.org/organ/2004.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed
Consent to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States
Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 349, 371 n.117 (1999) (citing a statistic
which notes that “25,000 Americans suffer brain deaths every year and only
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technology and surgical skills, each person who opts to become an
organ and tissue donor has the potential of saving and enhancing
up to 50 lives, and can take up to eight people off the organ
transplant waiting list.44 Yet, any hope that medical science may
provide to those eagerly awaiting recipients is regrettably buried
along with the bodies of those possessing transplantable organs
that never consented to donate them. When an individual dies
without donating his or her organs, his or her potential life-saving
organs regrettably go to waste.
The challenge for legislators and policy-makers has therefore
been to find alternative methods of encouraging people to donate
their organs, rather than relying on their altruistic tendencies,
thereby ensuring that suitable organs do not go to waste.
B. Ethical Considerations
Ethical hindrances have created another obstacle in obtaining
adequate numbers of organs. Ethical values are a major part of the
fabric of our society, and they also play a large role in shaping
medical policy and law.45 Thus, while many innovative methods
have been suggested which could potentially solve the organ
shortage crisis in United States,46 many of these methods have
been ignored due to ethical considerations.47 According to one
expert in the field of organ donation, technological advances have
placed strains on our existing ethical conceptions.48

2,500 become donors”).
44
John Zen Jackson, When it Comes to Transplant Organs, Demand Far
Exceeds Supply, 170 N.J. L.J. 910 (Dec. 16, 2002).
45
See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 6-10 (4th Ed. 1994) (discussing biomedical ethics’
influence on the medical profession and on public policy decision making).
46
See infra Part III (mentioning such possibilities as eliminating groups of
people from organ donor wait-lists, adopting a policy of presumed consent, and
allowing a free market to exist for organs).
47
PRICE, supra note 14, at 2.
48
See id. (“[T]he ‘technological imperative’ to keep pushing back the
barriers can place enormous strains on our legal and ethical institutions and
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Often, many of the pertinent ethical considerations with regard
to organ donation depend on when and from whom the organ is
being procured. For example, from an ethical point of view, a
major difference exists between obtaining organs from living
donors (in a procedure referred to as living donor organ
transplantation or LDT) and obtaining organs from cadaveric
donors (in a procedure referred to as cadaveric donor organ
transplantation or CDT).49 Despite the superior survival rates when
living donor organ transplantation is performed,50 that method
carries with it more ethical dilemmas than does cadaveric donor
organ transplantation.51
1. Living Donor Organ Transplantation Ethical Considerations
Procuring an organ from a living donor can carry with it many
ethical complexities. One issue is the difficulty in defining “injury”
for medical purposes. While some doctors believe that the removal
of an organ is justified by its proprietary use in helping another,52 it
is more often recognized that the removal of an organ for
transplantation constitutes an “injury” in ethical terms since it
involves physical damage and permanent destruction of the human
body.53 Medical doctors are charged with the duty of beneficence
and believe strongly in the principle of non-malfeasance.54
Furthermore, all doctors take the Hippocratic Oath, which states

frameworks of analysis.”).
49
See generally, GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at xvii-xxii. Although
there is considerable overlap in the issues existing in both LDT and CDT, they
will be analyzed separately for the purpose of this Note.
50
Id. at xviii.
51
See id. at xviii-xxiv.
52
PRICE, supra note 14, at 10.
53
Id.
54
GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 2. The principle of beneficence
refers to a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. BEACHUMP, supra
note 45, at 260. The principle of non-malfeasance asserts an obligation not to
inflict harm on others. Id. at 189.
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that they will “help [their patients], or at least do no harm.”55 Thus,
from the doctor’s perspective, some higher justification must exist
for harming a living donor to make organ transplantation medically
permissible.56
A second issue deals with the human conception of
“personhood.” With the goal of helping others as a priority, there is
the potential that incompetent and insensate individuals, such as
anencephalics57 or infants or patients in a permanent vegetative
state,58 will be taken advantage of by the removal of their organs in
the absence of their consent.59 The fear of procuring organs from
non-consenting living individuals then leads to an inevitable
dilemma: are all individuals to be treated equally when lives are at
stake and the opportunity to save them exists, or do we place
greater emphasis on saving the lives of the healthy, even when it is
at the expense of losing the lives of those with who are unable to
greatly contribute to society?60
A third concern which affects many experimental living organ
donor procedures is the issue of risk versus benefit.61 Policy
makers must determine to what extent certain experimental
procedures will be explored and tested for the sake of helping
others, even with the full consent of the patient.62 According to
some, a determined “threshold of benefit” should be required in
every procedure—requiring a minimum amount of good to derive

55

GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21.
Id. at 2-3.
57
A person without a brain. See STEDTMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 64
(3d ed. 1972).
58
As opposed to persons who have suffered total brain death, persons in a
permanent vegetative state still demonstrate certain normal brain stem functions,
such as cycles of sleep and wakefulness, the ability to breathe and maintain
blood pressure unassisted, and several reflexes. Roby S. Shapiro, The Case of
L.W.: An Argument for a Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute, 15
OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 441 (1990).
59
PRICE, supra note 14, at 11.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56

FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC

4/18/2006 1:07 PM

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONORS

341

from its use—to determine if it is worth attempting.63 However,
ascertaining the appropriate “threshold” can sometimes be very
challenging.64 These concerns and others explain the reluctance in
the medical community to incentivize or even encourage the use of
living donor organ transplantation.65
2. Cadaveric Donor Organ Transplantation Ethical
Considerations
Due to the plethora of ethical concerns involved with living
donor organ transplantation, health professionals instead have
turned to cadaveric donor organ transplantation as the preferred
method of organ procurement. However, CDT is not without its
own ethical issues. The major ethical issues involved in organ
transplants include concerns about: (1) preservation of the integrity
and dignity of the human body,66 and (2) determination of when
and how to honor the wishes of the deceased.67 For instance, policy
makers must determine whether the next of kin may dictate if and
how organs of the deceased should be allocated when a donor has
died without expressing consent to donate his organs.68 Other
ethical and administrative issues arise concerning fair allocation
63

Id. (citing the Nuffeld Working Party which asserted that xenotransplants
should only commence when there was a ‘reasonable chance of success’).
64
See id. (explaining that historically, people are unwilling to resist
tangible benefit even in the face of unknown risk).
65
See, e.g., AMA Guidelines infra note 191 (proposing use of financial
incentives only for non-living donors).
66
The President’s Council on Bioethics, Staff Background Paper, Organ
Transplantation: Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Choices, http://www.bioethics.
gov/background/org_transplant.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
The President’s Council on Bioethics]. This is an idea which one researcher
labels as “a desacralization of the human body.” John H. Evans, Commodifying
Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial Incentives for Organ
Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1003, 1023 (2003) (“The notion that
the body is somehow sacred and different from other objects is one of the
deepest cultural notions in at least the Western culture tradition.”).
67
The President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, at Part IV.
68
PRICE, supra note 14, at 15.
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methods, such as determining which potential donees receive
organs when they become available, and how that priority should
be determined.69
One primary area of ethical concern for both policymakers and
lawmakers, even in the field of CDT, is the potential
commodification of human organs.70 Concerns regarding the
commodification of organs include the potential coercion and
exploitation of those individuals most in need of money,71 and a
general feeling that organ commodification in any form is
inconsistent with the “most basic human values.”72
The aforementioned issues concerning both living donor organ
transplantation and cadaveric donor organ transplantation have the
potential to impede any legislative reform undertaken to resolve
the current organ deficiency. Theses ethical barriers must be
considered when creating any new organ procurement method
aimed at satisfying the growing need for organs.
C. Legislative Background
Aside from the ethical concerns, any new method for procuring
organs must also overcome a legal obstacle. Physicians’ increasing
ability to successfully transplant organs has precipitated much
legislation.73 Both the federal and state governments have enacted
69

Id. at 18. This Note will focus primarily on CDT, although much has
been written on LTD as a solution as well.
70
See id. at 367-417. According to Dr. Abdallah S. Daar, a Professor at the
University of Toronto, “Few questions in biomedical ethics are as challenging at
present as the question of paid organ donation for transplantation, raising as it
does difficult issues related to the body, the soul, property rights, autonomy,
limitations of freedom, cultural/ethical pluralism and professional versus
societal perceptions.” Id. at 367.
71
GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, GUIDANCE FOR DOCTORS ON
TRANSPLANTATION OF ORGANS FROM LIVE DONORS, point 3 (1992), reprinted
in GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 173.
72
World Health Organization, Resolution WHA40.13, Development of
Guiding Principles for Human Organ Transplants, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 7, at 467.
73
Powhida, supra note 43, at 352-53.
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legislation to deal with the relatively new phenomenon of organ
transplants.74 Unfortunately, much of this legislation serves as an
impasse to, rather than a route to, potential avenues of organ
procurement. Congress and various state legislatures have enacted
many laws with the express purpose of addressing the issues
related to the rapidly growing field of organ transplant
jurisprudence. Specifically, both federal and state legislators have
placed various restrictions on organ trafficking and sale over the
past two decades.
1. Federal Legislation
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation
Act in an effort to address the needs of desperate families seeking
organs and financial assistance for transplants, while combating
the beginnings of a commercial market for organs.76 One integral
aspect of NOTA is the creation of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN).77 Among other tasks, the OPTN
established a national list of individuals who need organs78 and a
national system to match available organs with those in need.79
In addition to the creation of a national list of potential organ
donors and receivers, another important aspect of NOTA is a
provision which prohibits organ purchases.80 This provision states,
in pertinent part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce.”81 Violation of this provision
of NOTA carries with it a fine of up to $50,000, a prison sentence
75

74

See infra Part II.C.1-3.
42 U.S.C. § 274 (2001).
76
S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975,
3976-3977.
77
42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (2001).
78
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i) (2001).
79
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001).
80
42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2001).
81
Id.
75
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of up to five years, or both.82
2. State Legislation
Laws concerning medical treatment, consent to procedures, and
the definition of death fall under state jurisdiction.83 The
prohibition of organ purchases in NOTA relates solely to interstate
commerce.84 Therefore, the federal ban on purchasing human
organs will not be violated unless the purchase occurs across state
lines or otherwise impacts interstate commerce. However, a few
years after the enactment of NOTA, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) created the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), recommending the
prohibition of the sale or purchase of human organs for “valuable
consideration” within individual states.85 Close to half of the fifty
states have adopted portions of the UAGA.86
Over the past decade, some states aspiring to increase the
number of viable organs available within the state while still
remaining within the guidelines of NOTA have taken modest steps
to increase the number of people willing to donate their organs
upon death.87 For example, some states have created trust funds to
spur organ donation by increasing public awareness regarding the
need for organ and tissue donation.88 Delaware created the Organ

82
83
84

42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975,

3983.
85

See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003).
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act
Has Been Adopted, 8A U.L.A. 3 (2003) (indicating jurisdictions where the
UAGA has been adopted and date in which they were effective in those
individual jurisdictions). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-9 (1999) (declaring
contracts for donation of organs to be lawful and requiring repayment of any
“monetary consideration” received upon revocation).
87
See Siegel, supra note 16, at 940-43.
88
Steven P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End
America’s Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 131 (2004).
86
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and Tissue Donation Awareness Trust Fund, 89 used to develop
promotional campaigns and school programs encouraging donor
registration through the state’s driver’s license program.90 Ohio
created a similar trust fund, called the Second Chance Trust
Fund,91 whose committee is charged with, among other things, the
duty of approving “brochures, written materials, and electronic
media regarding anatomical gifts and anatomical gift procedures
for use in driver training schools.”92 Florida created the Florida
Organ and Tissue Donor Education and Procurement Trust Fund,
which distributes its funds for “educational purposes aimed at
increasing the number of organ and tissue donors.”93
3. New York State Legislation
In 1985, New York adopted its own version of NOTA
legislation, stating: “It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer for valuable
consideration any human organ for use in human
transplantation.”94 In February of 2004, New York’s legislature
created by statute the “Life – Pass It On” Trust Fund (the Fund).95
This law stipulates that money in the Fund “shall be expended only
for organ transplant research and education projects approved by
the commissioner of health, or to provide grants to not-for-profit
corporations in this state which are incorporated for the purpose of
increasing and promoting organ and tissue donation awareness.”96
The recent initiatives in New York and other states such as
Delaware, Ohio, and Florida do not represent drastic changes in
existing law. Rather, they are merely modest attempts at easing the
current organ shortage problem without crossing the prohibited
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2729(a) (2003).
Id. at § 2730(b)(1).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.15 (Anderson 2002).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.17(G)(4) (Anderson 2002).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.5216(1) (West 2005).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002).
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 95-d (McKinney Supp. 2005).
Id. at § 95-d(3).
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line of organ selling or buying drawn by NOTA and the UAGA.
With the organ shortage reaching crisis status,97 it is clear that
more proactive and radical steps should be taken in order to
adequately manage this predicament, keeping in mind the ethical
and legal factors which serve as potential obstacles to any
legislative reform.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
With the deficit between those waiting for organs and those
donating them continuing to widen, government officials and
academic scholars have found it necessary to consider other viable
solutions to encourage organ donation. Two distinct methods for
increasing the donor pool have been identified. The first method is
to maximize the efficiency of the existing organ procurement
system through distribution and allocation improvements.98 The
second method is to increase the supply of organs by expanding
into new donor populations by way of education or providing
incentives.99
A. Increasing the Efficiency of the Procurement System
One innovative but controversial method aimed at maximizing
the efficient use of available organs is to eliminate entire classes of
people from recipient lists. Such arguments have been explored
with regard to liver transplants for alcoholics100 and with regard to
convicted criminals.101 Congress has also focused on the efficient
allocation of currently available organs through the formation of a
97

See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 10.
99
Id.
100
Alvin H. Moss & Mark Siegler, Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for
Liver Transplantation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34,
at 275.
101
Lawrence J, Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jecker, Should a Criminal
Receive a Heart Transplant? Medical Justice v. Societal Justice, in THE ETHICS
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 294.
98
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network to assist local agencies in distributing organs and through
the creation of a task force on organ donation to monitor the
problems and issues related to organ donation and
transplantation.102
1. Eliminating Alcoholics
The primary reason given for possibly barring alcoholics from
competing equally with other patients on the liver transplant
waiting list is that individuals should bear some responsibility for
medical problems, such as cirrhosis,103 associated with voluntary
choices, such as alcohol abuse.104 According to this proposal, due
to dire scarcity of donor livers, it would only be fair that
individuals who develop liver disease through no fault of their
own—such as those who have a congenital liver disease—should
have a higher priority in receiving a liver transplant than those
whose liver disease results from failure to obtain treatment for
alcoholism.105
Those opposed to disqualification of alcoholics from
procurement lists argue that it is based on nothing more than an
unjust common conviction that alcoholics are morally
blameworthy for their own condition and thus should be
disqualified from the competition for rare donor livers.106
Opponents of barring alcoholics from equal access to donor livers
insist that qualification for a new organ should not require moral
virtue or a cancellation of a moral vice on the part of the would-be
recipient.107 Rather, moral evaluation should be entirely excluded
from all deliberations concerning candidacy for liver

102

See infra. Part III.A.3.
Progressive disease of the liver. STEDTMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
256 (3d ed. 1972).
104
Moss & Siegler, supra note 100, at 278.
105
Id. at 279.
106
Carol Cohen et al., Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation, in THE
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 286.
107
Id. at 287.
103
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transplantation.108
2. Eliminating Convicted Criminals
Some scholars have argued to exclude convicted criminals
from procurement lists.109 However, eliminating convicted
criminals from recipient lists, based merely on past behavior, may
not be justifiable from a medical justice perspective.110 There is a
general acceptance within the medical profession that physicians
owe patients consideration based solely on potential medical
benefits, without any regard to non-medical factors.111
Nonetheless, medical justice is often tainted by societal factors,112
and in a just society, principles of distributive justice govern the
distribution of burdens and benefits.113 Thus, scholars argue that, in
a society where certain life-saving medical treatments are limited,
those who have already taken benefits away from those who have
attempted to live justly should not be eligible for further benefits,
such as those limited treatments.114
Methods for alleviating the critical organ shortage by
eliminating certain undesirable organ transplant recipients are
radical and will require sacrificing sacred notions of justice and
valuable oppositions to discrimination in the medical profession.115
In contrast to the previous two suggestions, Congress has created a
108

Id.
Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 101.
110
Id. at 298.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 299.
114
Id. at 300. Schneiderman and Jecker therefore propose that convicted
criminals should be entitled to only a “rudimentary decent minimum” level of
care, which would not include equal access to such treatments as heart
transplants. Id. at 303.
115
Gina Kolata, Inmate Fears Death Because Prison Won’t Finance
Transplant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1994, § 1, at 6. According to Arthur Caplan, “It
is absolutely wrong to make judgments about past behavior, criminal conduct,
moral worth, indictments, charges or conviction” for the purposes of allocating
organs.” Id.
109
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less controversial method to increase the efficiency of the current
organ procurement system, which is highlighted in the next
section.
3. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Task
Force
Congress, with the passing of NOTA, created its own system
for maintaining an efficient method of allocating organs.116 The
OPTN was developed to help regional organ procurement agencies
better distribute organs to a broader area and adopt more uniform
and higher quality standards for the procurement and distribution
of donated organs.117 These regional organ procurement
organizations are charged with a duty to locate potential organ
donors and arrange for the acquisition, preservation, and
transportation of the organs to organ centers.118 In addition,
Congress has created a Task Force on Organ Transplantation119 to
examine the problems and issues relating to organ procurement
and transplantation.120
The success of Congressional methods of increasing the
efficiency of organ procurement and allocation is questionable.
The shortage of suitable organs continues to grow and the need for
transplantable organs is at a record high. For the first time, the
number of people waiting for a deceased donor kidney transplant
in the United States has recently exceeded 60,000.121 It seems that
116

42 U.S.C. § 274 (2001).
See James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation
Policy, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 13 (1989) (“The role of the OPTN was
to establish a registry of patients in need of organs and potential recipient lists
on the registry.”).
118
42 U.S.C. § 273(a-b) (2001).
119
National Organ Transplantation Act, Title 1-Task Force on Organ
Transplantation, 42 U.S.C. § 273 (1994).
120
Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 101(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
121
Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Kidney Transplant Need
Exceeds 60,000,http://www.optn.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=358 (reported on
Oct. 14, 2004).
117
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Congress’s focus on the efficient allocation of the current supply
of organs has not been successful in reversing the organ shortage
crisis. The evidence of the steady decline in the supply of
available, transplantable organs has encouraged some
governmental institutions to shift gears in their approach to the
problem and attempt to increase the supply of organs made
available by increasing the actual supply of organs rather than
efficiently allocating the existing supply.
B. Increasing the Supply of Organs
There are many possible ways to increase the supply of
organs.122 Among them are adopting a system of presumed
consent, creating a market for organs, and expanding the criteria
for transplantable organs. Many of these suggested methods of
increasing the organ supply require the modification of existing
law and policy, and reconsideration of entrenched moral and legal
frameworks and are still untested and unproven. Nonetheless, some
of these newer methods have gained support in academic circles
and in other parts of the world.
1. Presumed Consent
One suggested proposal for increasing organ donation is the
creation of “presumed consent” statutes.123 Under this method,
unless a person affirmatively “opts out” during his lifetime, his
organs will automatically be donated at death.124 Many European
122

Some of these methods will be explained below.
For a full discussion promoting this solution, see Kelly Ann Keller, The
Bed of Life: A Discussion of Organ Donation, its Legal and Scientific History,
and a Recommended “Opt-Out” Solution to Organ Scarcity, 32 STETSON L.
REV. 855 (2003). Cf. Powhida, supra note 43 (questioning the constitutional
validity of presumed consent statutes).
124
See Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of
Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1019, 1031 (1999) (referring alternatively to presumed consent as “routine
salvage”).
123
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countries have adopted this method.125 Despite being suggested by
the UAGA,126 only a minority of states in this country enacted
presumed consent statutes when they adopted other parts of the
UAGA.127 Even in those states which have adopted presumed
consent statutes,128 the statute’s application is limited to bodies
under the authority of the coroner or medical examiner,129 and is
generally only applicable to the removal of corneas and pituitary
glands.130 In most states, failure to “opt out” is not akin to
consent.131 Rather “reasonable efforts” are required to obtain
consent from the next of kin before organs can be harvested.132
Some opponents of the presumed consent method question the
very presumption upon which the laws are based, which is that
individuals actually would consent to the donation of their organs
if they had been presented the with the option while alive.133 Other
opponents to the presumed consent method see it as failing on
ethical grounds, believing the concept of “silence as consent” to be
antithetical to American culture.134
2. Creating a Market for Organs
An alternative solution is opening a futures market for

125

Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B. U. L. REV.
359, 381 n.77 (2000).
126
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 85, at 43.
127
Rao, supra note 125, at 380.
128
See id. at 380 n.76.
129
Id. at 381 n.77.
130
Id. at 380.
131
Id. at 381.
132
Id. In practice, however, the difference between laws requiring
reasonable efforts and those presuming consent may only be one of semantics.
Id. at 382.
133
R. M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical
Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 176.
134
Robinson, supra note 124, at 1032.
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organs.135 A so-called “organ market” would allow individuals
before death, or surviving family members after death, to sell their
own or their loved ones’ organs in a private contract.136 Thus far
this proposal has been met with widespread resistance because it
entails the full-scale transformation of the body into property and
might lead to unequal allocation of organs.137 The fear is that the
wealthiest individuals will have the greatest access to organs by
virtue of their wealth.138 Despite these drawbacks, this suggested
solution has gained mild acceptance in academic circles.139
3. Transplanting “Marginal” or “Extended Criteria” Organs
American society has witnessed a “shift in the donor pool.”140
Several conditions, including increased seat-belt use, have
deprived transplantation of its most reliable sources of pristine
organs.141 This scarcity in organs has led transplant specialists to
relax the standards of who can donate.142 The result is a
considerable increase in the transplanting of “marginal” or
“extended criteria” organs in the last several years.143 Criteria such
as age, health, and lifestyle of donors have all but evaporated.144
135

See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human
Organs, 14 J. HEALTH & HUM. POL. 57 (1989) (discussing the possibility of
regulating a market for human organs). See also S. Gregory Boyd M.D.,
Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH., 417, 468-472
(2003) (proposing different organ market possibilities).
136
President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, at Part III.4.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See Calandrillo, supra note 88, at 108-111 (calling future markets a
“solid step in the right direction, and certainly a substantial improvement over
current supply incentives”).
140
Gretchen Reynolds, Will Any Organ Do?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July
10, 2005, at 37.
141
Id. at 38.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 38-39 (referencing one case in which N.Y.U. transplanted a liver
from a deceased 80-year-old and commenting on the recent phenomenon of
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With the demand for transplant organs still growing, despite these
lower standards, some academics have suggested using other even
more controversial and untested approaches to fill the donor
pool.145
Any method adopted for increasing the supply or organs must
seek to strike a balance between potential success and ethical and
legal concerns. Therefore, a method which could potentially
increase the supply of organs, but suffers from being ethically
questionable and legally unsound, will be met with opposition
from any number of ethicists, scholars or legislators. One solution
which seems to strike the balance of these factors may be to offer
moderate financial incentives to donors or their families in
exchange for their organs upon death.
IV. PROVIDING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
One solution at the forefront of legal and policy discussions146
is to allow for a financial compensation to potential donors or their
transplanting livers infected with Hepatitis C into healthy patients).
145
Those include: (1) harvesting the organs of executed prisoners, see
LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS: AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF DEATH SENTENCE ORGAN REMOVAL
STATUTES (1999). But see Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until it Hurts: Prisoners are
not the Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593 (2002)
(arguing against the proposal that organs be obtained from executed prisoners);
(2) a communitarian approach in which people’s preferences are changed
through moral persuasion, see Amitai Etzioni, Organ Donation: A
Communitarian Approach, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 5 (2003); and (3) a
system of mutuality where only those consenting to donate their own organs
would receive priority for a needed transplant, see Richard Schwindt & Aidan
Vining, Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Pool for Transplant Organs, 23 J.
HEALTH, POL., POL’Y, & L., 725, 727 (1998). See also Rupert Jarvis, Join the
Club: A Modest Proposal to Increase Availability of Donor Organs, in THE
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 190-91 (extolling the virtues
of this system for potentially reducing donor demand while at the same time
increasing the supply).
146
See Ovetta Wiggins, Pa. Organ Donors Get $300 Boost, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 27, 2002, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/
inquirer/3346239.htm?1c.
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families in exchange for their consent to donate their organs or
their deceased family member’s organs upon death.147 The theory
is that compensation in some form would provide adequate
incentives for organ donation which do not exist under the current
altruistic-reliant system, and that increasing incentives to donate
would thereby lead to an increased number of organ donations.148
A. Types of Financial Incentives
There are three types of incentives: non-financial or “moral”
incentives, direct economic payment, and indirect financial
incentives.149 Because it would most adequately address the above
mentioned hurdles facing any organ donation reform, a program of
indirect financial incentives would be the most effective. There are
many hurdles, however, in enacting a program that involves the
offering of financial incentives in exchange for organs, including: a
practical hurdle in obtaining donor consent, an ethical hurdle in
accepting the moral consequences of such a program, and a legal
hurdle in fitting the program into existing legislation.
The first type of incentive is non-financial, referred to as
“moral” incentives.150 These moral incentives to donate organs
might include commemorative certificates, plaques, or medals of
honor to be given to donors or their families in order to express
appreciation for their life-saving gifts.151 Although this moral
incentive model may avoid many of the ethical pitfalls that are
normally associated with real monetary incentives, it is potentially
ineffective as it is an insufficient incentive to produce the number
of organs needed.152 Another type of incentive is direct economic
147

See Sten, supra note 34, at 214-19 (advocating a “death penalty pilot
program” whereby a $1,000 dollar payment is made to families of organ
donors).
148
Boyd, supra note 135, at 472.
149
Robert V. Veatch, Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for
Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 19, 21-24 (2003).
150
Id. at 20-21.
151
Id. at 21.
152
Id. at 21.
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payment.153 This approach may be the most effective in eliciting
the largest number of organ donations, but it carries with it many
of the traditional concerns that exist with organ commodification
and organ markets, such as discrimination against the poor,154 the
potential for coercion of those desperate for food and money,155
and the concern about unethical offers.156 A third type of incentive
takes the form of indirect financial incentives.157 This includes
payments which serve as compensation for costs incurred in the
donation process,158 such as the funeral expenses of the donor or
the expenses incurred by family members in attending to the death
of the donor.159 One advantage to this system is that it creates some
distance between the decision to provide organs and the economic
benefit of doing so.160 However, the effectiveness and integrity of
this approach has encountered some criticism, as one scholar
explained that it is “immorally deceptive since [organs] would be
given under the pretense that there is no payment of cash to the
decision maker when, in effect, there is.”161 Regardless, this
solution is the most attractive because, unlike other proposed
solutions, it would address all three hurdles normally associated
with organ procurement reform.
1. Practical Hurdle—Obtaining Donor Consent
The indirect incentive plan has the potential of being an
effective form of motivation to encourage people to consent to
153

Id. at 26. Dr. Veatch himself endorses this approach, see id. at 31-33
(calling for a reassessment of old traditional liberal values in response to the
organ shortage crisis). See also Peters, supra note 34 (endorsing a plan where
donors are awarded a $1,000 gift for the donation of their organs).
154
Veatch, supra note 149, at 26.
155
Id. at 27.
156
Id. at 28-31.
157
Id. at 21-24.
158
See id. at 23-24.
159
Id. at 23.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 22-24.
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donate their organs upon death. Not only do preliminary studies in
this country indicate approval for such a plan, but financial
incentives programs have already been successful internationally.
In the United States, studies on the matter show a general
approval for incentives for organ donation in general, and a
preference towards indirect financial incentives. In 1992, it was
reported that nearly half of Americans support some kind of
financial incentive for donation.162
In 2003, a pilot study was performed to determine the public’s
attitude toward families ending the life support of their loved ones
in order to harvest his or her organs when various incentive
programs are in place.163 The 2003 study found that the amount of
money received from organ donation is a consideration in a
family’s decision to discontinue life support.164 Specifically, the
study indicated a preference for indirect commodification of
organs (such as paying for the expenses related to the donation
procedure) over a system where direct cash payments are made.165
162

See Warren, supra note 30 (citing a 1992 study that found that nearly
half of Americans support some kind of incentive for organ donation).
163
See Evans, supra note 66, at 1003.
164
Id. Admittedly, this study goes beyond the scope of this note in that it
seeks to prove that commodification of organs of some sort would lead to people
allowing the person with the organs die when they otherwise would not. Id. at
1008. However, if under these conditions financial incentives prove to be
sufficient motivation for organ donation, then a fortiori, when the patient is
already dead.
165
Evans, supra note 66, at 1020. According to the author, one possible
explanation for this is that people tend to consider dollars that circulate within
the same institutional sphere to have the same moral status. Therefore, using the
money from an organ donation would be acceptable to pay for the medical cost
of removing the organ but it would be unacceptable to use the money to buy a
car. Id. at 1022. Other studies did not produce as favorable results. Professors
Thomas J. Cossé and Terry M. Weisenberger of Robins School of Business in
Richmond, Virginia published their results on this subject in 1999. Thomas J.
Cossé & Terry M. Weisenberger, Encouraging Human Organ Donation:
Altruism Versus Financial Incentives, 6 J. NONPROFIT PUB. SECTOR MKTG. 77
(1999). In four separate surveys conducted over the course of four years in
Richmond, Virginia, participants were asked to respond to two questions: 1)
Should financial incentives be offered to encourage families to donate? and 2)
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Internationally, financial incentives for living kidney providers
have increased the supply of kidneys, and small payments for
burial expenses to the families of cadaveric donors have increased
the supply of organs in European countries.166
More important than the results from studies and surveys is the
actual success of this type of model in one state. Pennsylvania’s
attempt to use indirect financial incentives as a means of
encouraging more organ donations has been successful in
convincing many of its citizens to consent to donate their organs
upon death.
In 1994, Pennsylvania established the Organ Donation
Awareness Trust Fund.167 The program encouraged citizens to
register to donate organs and also sought contributions to the trust
fund.168 Initially, part of the money from the trust fund was to be
allocated to the compensation of donors for “reasonable hospital
and medical expenses, funeral expenses, and incidental expenses
incurred by the donor or donor’s family in connection with making
a vital organ donation,” totaling as much as $3,000 per organ
donor.169 By limiting expenditures to $3,000 per donor and
requiring payment be made directly to the funeral home or hospital
as opposed to the donor’s family, next of kin, or estate,
Pennsylvania legislators hoped that the compensation paid would
Describe your level of comfort, presenting donor option currently versus that of
financial incentives. Id. at 87. They concluded from the results that there is only
limited public support to use financial incentives to encourage organ donation.
Id. at 91. However, even Professors Cosse and Weisenberger concede that the
findings of the study should be limited to the southeastern metro area in which
the participants resided. Id.
166
Jackson, supra note 44.
167
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8621 (West Supp. 2005). The fund is now named
The Governor Robert P. Casey Memorial Organ and Donation Awareness Trust
Fund, named after the former Pennsylvania governor who was a multiple organ
transplant recipient. The fund was created by State Representative Bill Robinson
after he learned that the mother of a boy, whose heart and liver were donated to
Casey, had no life insurance benefits and had to raise money to be able to bury
her son. Wiggins, supra note 146.
168
Jackson, supra note 44.
169
Id.
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not be deemed “valuable consideration” to “acquire, receive or
otherwise transfer” the organ, thereby avoiding the prohibitions on
the sale of organs in NOTA.170 Pennsylvania state health officials
subsequently lowered the incentive to $300 per organ donor.171
The revised plan finally went into effect in January 2002.172
Despite speculation that the modified amount offered to donors
or their families would do little to ameliorate their hardships and
would be deemed as merely incidental,173 the plan seemed to have
an immediate effect. Between January and May of 2002, 19 donors
or donor families applied for the $300 benefit.174 Contributions
collected from motor vehicle registration and driver’s license and
identification card renewals combined to add over $600,000 to the
fund from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004.175 Furthermore, 41.83%
of Pennsylvanians (or 3,803,915 Pennsylvanians) carrying a
driver’s license, permit, or identification card now display the
“Organ Donor” designation.176 This represents a .5% increase over
the year before, or an additional 83,344 citizens of the state of
Pennsylvania, consenting to donate their organs upon death. Thus,
at least in Pennsylvania, indirect financial incentives have proven
to be a successful means of increasing organ donations.
2. Ethical Hurdle
The greatest objection to a compensation policy regarding

170

Id.
Boyd, supra note 135, at 460.
172
Id. at 459.
173
See Jackson, supra note 44 (“The amounts being considered as financial
incentives in Pennsylvania and under the AMA’s proposal seem trivial, and are
unlikely to ameliorate the hardship that a family may experience following
death.”).
174
Wiggins, supra note 146.
175
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ORGAN DONATION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2,
available at http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/lib/health/OrganDonation
AnnualReport4pdf2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
176
Id.
171
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organ donation is that it “opens the door” to ethical issues and
problems, such as the dangers and fears of the possible
ramifications of any commodification of the human body.177
However, by reframing old values in the context of the current
organ deficit crisis and setting up a system where strong guidelines
are followed and indirect and modest incentives are offered, these
vehement ethical concerns can be assuaged.
a. Utilitarianism
From an ethical standpoint, what is considered right and wrong
is often dependent on the philosophical perspective through which
something is perceived.178 In philosophical thought, there exist two
well-known perspectives which are relevant to a discussion of
whether or not the use of commodification-like methods is
ethically appropriate: deontology and consequentialism.179 A
deontological perspective determines rightness or wrongness based
on an independent system of values and not purely by
consequences.180 By contrast, utilitarianism, a key brand of
consequentialistic thought,181 judges consequences in terms of their
use value.182 Thus, from a utilitarian perspective the rightness or
wrongness of an action is determined not by an objective set of
values but by whether, on balance, it produces more pleasure than
pain.183
From a utilitarian standpoint, certain medical interventions
which would normally be considered ethically objectionable can be
justified if, in the greater sense, they have the prospect of being

177

The President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, Part III.3.
See GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 1 (“As well as forming an
ethical guide to medical professionals, philosophical approaches and principles
are at the centre of medical law.”).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
178

FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC

360

4/18/2006 1:07 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

beneficial as opposed to harmful.184 Following this approach in
organ donation policy, financial incentive methods used to increase
the supply of organs would then be considered by utilitarians to be
ethically meritorious simply because more persons who would
otherwise die would be kept alive.185 Thus, using
commodification-like techniques to procure more organs would be
morally just to a consequentialist, merely because the
consequences of such techniques would save more lives in the long
run.
b. Re-examining Old Values
The possibility of commodification-like methods brings other
ethical concerns such as the integrity and dignity of the human
body and general feelings that commodification methods are
inconsistent with human values.186 These concerns, although
admirable, are quite limiting in times of crisis. Therefore, it is
necessary to re-examine those values in the context of the current
organ shortage crisis.
From a legal theory perspective, changing times often call for a
change in law. In many instances, proactive legislation is needed to
recognize change and adjust the law accordingly. When those
situations arise, legislators have a responsibility to act for their
citizens and change the law to meet the changes in society. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once said:
When we find that in large and important branches of the
law the various grounds of policy on which the various
rules have been justified are later inventions to account for
what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we
have a right to reconsider the popular reasons, and, taking a
broader view of the field, to decide anew whether those
reasons are satisfactory.187
184
185
186
187

Id. at 2-3.
See Evans, supra note 66, at 1022.
See supra Part II.B.2.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 26 (Barnes and
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Thus, times of crisis and necessity cry out for a need to
reassess historical notions of right and wrong. Ideas and
suggestions which may have previously offended our sacred
notions of morality and ethics and have been the basis for old laws
might then need to be reexamined in light of new potential benefits
that are being offered to society. Following this concept, legislators
must reassess their past apprehension towards financial incentives
in light of the current shortage of transplantable organs.188
c. The AMA Guidelines
In the medical community a financial incentive program for
organ donation has begun to gain more support. The American
Medical Association (AMA) has adopted guidelines for a pilot
program for financial incentives for organ donors.189 The new
policy, entitled “Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric
Donors,” was recently introduced in July of 2004. The policy
asserts that financial incentives may be offered to potential organ
donors provided that certain guidelines are followed.190 Some of

Noble Books 2004) (1881).
188
See also Boyd, supra note 135, at 471 (concluding that there can and
should be an effective market option that is ethically palatable, which the author
calls a “practical market”).
189
American Medical Association, H-370.979, Financial Incentives for
Organ Procurement, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_
online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-370.979.HTM (last visited Oct. 19,
2004).
190
The following is the text from the AMA guidelines:
The AMA has adopted the following guidelines for a pilot program of
financial incentives for future contracts regarding organ donations: (1)
there is enough evidence in favor of employing some form of financial
incentive to justify the implementation of a pilot program. This
program, as with any policy involving financial incentives to encourage
organ donation, should have adequate regulatory safeguards to ensure
that the health of donors and recipients is in no way jeopardized, and
that the quality of the organ supply is not degraded. This pilot program
should operate for a limited time, in a limited geographical region, and
have the following safeguards. (2) Incentives should be limited to
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the key aspects of these guidelines include prohibiting the use of
organs from a living person and limiting the financial incentives to
that of “moderate value.”
These guidelines, if used as a framework for a new
compensation scheme, would advance efforts to alleviate many of
the ethical concerns commonly associated with organ
commodification schemes. An absence of the ethical concerns
should then create a general public attitude which favors the idea
of organs donated for financial compensation.
d. Indirect and Modest Incentives
Finally, a program which offers modest and indirect incentives
future contracts offered to prospective donors. By entering into a future
contract, an adult would agree while still competent to donate his or her
organs after death. In return, the appropriate state agency would agree
to give some financial remuneration to the donor’s family or estate after
the organs have been retrieved and judged medically suitable for
transplantation. Under a system of future contracts, several other
conditions would apply: (a) No incentives should be allowed for organs
procured from living donors. (b) It would be inappropriate to offer
financial incentives for organ donation to anyone other than the person
who would actually serve as the source of the organs. Only the
potential donor, and not the potential donor’s family or other third
party, may be given the option of accepting financial incentives for the
donation of his or her own organs. In addition, the potential donor must
be a competent adult when the decision to donate is made, and the
donor must not have committed suicide. (c) Any incentive should be of
moderate value and should be the lowest amount that can reasonably be
expected to encourage organ donation. By designating a state agency to
administer the incentive, full control over the level of incentive can be
maintained. (d) Payment of any incentive should occur only after the
harvested organs have been judged medically suitable for
transplantation. Suitability should continue to be determined in
accordance with the procedures of the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network. (e) Incentives should play no part in the
allocation of donated organs among potential transplant recipients. The
distribution of organs for transplantation should continue to be
governed only by ethically appropriate criteria relating to medical need.
Id.
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to donors or their families would seem to sidestep many of the
ethical issues that other commodification methods may face. For
example, one common ethical concern is that commodification
could potentially be a source of inappropriate coercion to those in
need of money.191 However, by following a model similar to the
one in Pennsylvania, this concern can be alleviated. Modest
incentives which are paid to a funeral home, hospital, or service
provider would be enough incentive to encourage without
coercion. Some might argue that this type of program is
“immorally deceptive”192 since money is actually being transferred
to the donor. However, the indirect nature and modest value of the
financial incentives, based on Pennsylvania’s successful model and
proposed for New York, would certainly mitigate the moral
turpitude of this type of incentive program to some degree.
3. Legal Hurdle
Even in enacting NOTA Congress asserted that it was not
categorically opposed to all forms of financial compensation for
donation.193 The legislative history indicates a desire to grant fair
access to transplants to those who are in danger of losing their lives
without the transplanted organ.194 NOTA’s Congressional
legislative history highlights a desire on behalf of Congress to
encourage the consideration of “alternative reimbursement
policies” such as payment for transplantation procedures.195
Furthermore, the Senate Report on NOTA stipulates that in
enacting NOTA, it was not the intent of the committee that
reasonable costs incurred in the process of organ donation be
considered part of “valuable consideration.”196 Indeed, NOTA
itself emphasizes that the term “valuable consideration” does not
191

See supra Part II.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
193
See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15-16 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 3982.
192
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include various payments associated with the transplant procedure
or “the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the
donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the
organ.”197 Thus, although Congress intended to prevent the
commercialization of the human body, such evidence illustrates
that Congress intended to permit some organ procurement
procedures which employ financial incentives.198 The creation of
an alternative reimbursement policy which involves compensation
which is less than “valuable” would not then endanger what
Congress was intending to protect under NOTA—fair access to
organs to all those in need.
In fact, Congress and some states have already begun to
endorse financial incentive programs as a viable way to solve the
organ shortage problem. In April 2004, Title 42 of the United
States Code was amended to provide for the “reimbursement of
travel and subsistence expenses incurred by individuals toward
making living donations of their organs.”199 In addition, federal
legislation is pending which would “provide payments for the
purchase of life insurance policies or annuities, payable to a
donor’s designee”200—thereby providing modest compensation to
the families or loved ones of those who volunteer their organs
upon their own death.
Among the various states, financial incentive-type legislation
has also been enacted.201 Aside from Pennsylvania’s recently
enacted program to promote increased organ donation,202 the state
of Georgia enacted legislation to grant a discount on driver’s
license issuance or renewal fees for those who indicate a
197

42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2001).
Sten, supra note 34, at 216.
199
42 U.S.C.A. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005).
200
H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. (2003). See also Alexander S. Curtis, Congress
Considers Incentives for Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 51
(2003) (discussing a series of bills, relating to types of incentives to offer would
be donors, introduced during the 107th Congress).
201
See Calandrillo, supra note 88, at 44-46 (discussing the fairly recent
legislation in Wisconsin and Georgia).
202
See supra Part IV.
198
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willingness to execute an anatomical gift on their application.203
More recently, the Wisconsin State Senate passed a bill calling for
a state income tax deduction of up to $10,000 to cover expenses
for residents who donate their organs.204 Although critics of the
legislation question whether the legislation would violate NOTA,
Wisconsin’s Governor expressed support of the bill.205 The law
became effective in January 2004.206 Other states have passed
similar legislation and many have already signed their bills into
law.207
V. NEW YORK’S POLICY ON ORGAN DONATION
In 1985, out of concern for the undesirable consequences organ
commodification could bring to the state, New York added Section
4307 to the Public Health Laws, in effect banning any form of sale
or purchase of human organs.208 The law declares, “It shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer for valuable consideration any human organ for
use in human transplantation.”209 However, it is clear that an
indirect financial incentive program, similar to the one already in
place in Pennsylvania, would violate neither the language nor the
203

GA. CODE ANN. §40-5-25[d] (2004).
See Jo Napolitano, Wisconsin Senate Approves Tax Deduction for
Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A12 (reporting on the passing of
the bill in the State Senate after the after it had been “overwhelmingly
approved” by the State Assembly in November of 2003).
205
Id. (quoting Governor Doyle as saying, “I’m very supportive of it.”).
206
Erin Madigan, States Offer Tax Breaks to Spur Organ Donation,
Stateline.org,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136
&languageId=1&contentId=15749 (Aug. 26, 2004).
207
See Transplant Living, Financial Aspects: State Tax Deductions and
Donor Laws, http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/
statetax.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) (listing eight other states which have
passed similar legislation).
208
See supra Part II.C.3.
209
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002).
204
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legislative intent of this law, and would even be consistent with
New York’s policy on public health and welfare in general.
A. The Language of Section 4307
The 1985 New York legislation mirrors the language in NOTA
by prohibiting organ transactions for “valuable consideration.”210
Congress indicated the words “valuable consideration” allows for
“alternative reimbursement policies,”211 and the legislative history
of NOTA even stipulates that “reasonable costs” incurred in the
process of organ donation should not be considered part of
“valuable consideration.”212 NOTA itself states that the term
“valuable consideration” does not include various payments
associated with the transplant procedure or “the expenses of travel,
housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in
connection with the donation of the organ.”213 No doubt, it was this
loose language that allowed Congress to enact §274f to allow for
the “reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses incurred by
individuals toward making living donations of their organs.”214
Thus, the conspicuous use of the same language, “valuable
consideration” in the New York statute, likely prohibits only
compensation
which
is
deemed
valuable.
Minimum
reimbursements for various transplant expenditures and other
expenses related to the procedure do not fall under the language of
the prohibition and would therefore likely be permissible under
Section 4307 as they are under NOTA.

210

Id.
S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15-16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3975, 3981.
212
Id. at 3982.
213
42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2001).
214
42 U.S.C. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005).
211
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B. Legislative Intent of Section 4307
The legislative history of Section 4307 indicates that some
system of moderate indirect financial incentives would not violate
the intentions of the New York state legislators who created the
law.215 However, the types and amounts of financial incentives
these legislators would allow are unclear. The view expressed by
one New York legislator was that the sale of human organs should
be prohibited for fear only of “widespread medical prostitution.”216
Minor incentive programs to induce citizens to consider
volunteering their organs are not likely to be considered “medical
prostitution”217 since the minimal value of the consideration would
hardly induce people to sell their organs simply for the value they
would provide in return. Furthermore, in 1989, the New York State
Task Force on Life and Law stated that it was following the federal
government’s model in recommending against any type of
incentive program in New York State.218 If that is the case, now
that the federal government has acted to initiate a program to
provide incentives to donors by offering reimbursement to donors
for such things as travel and subsistence expenses incurred while
making living donations of their organs,219 New York should
follow its lead and enact a similar program.
C. New York’s Policy on Public Health
The New York State Constitution contains a provision which
charges the state government with the affirmative responsibility to
act in areas of policy regarded to be of special importance, such as
public health.220 This provision states:
215

See Memorandum of Assemblyman Gorski, supra note 13.
Id.
217
Id.
218
TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND
DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES, THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND LAW 53 (2d ed. 1989).
219
42 U.S.C. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005).
220
See THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK 232
216
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The protection and promotion of the health of the
inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of
its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as
the legislature shall from time to time determine.221
Added in 1938 to the State Constitution, this section was meant
to place responsibility squarely on the state to protect and promote
public health.222 The actual constitutionalization of such a
provision is unique and indicates the State of New York’s strong
desire to ensure that its citizens’ needs in the area of health care
will be met.223
The organ shortage crisis at hand is an area of policy that must
be considered “of special importance.” The inevitable and
unfortunate death of over 8,000 New York citizens is a public
health crisis that should fall under the characterization of this
provision of New York’s constitution. It is therefore incumbent
upon the New York State legislature to heed to this provision and
to use the means necessary to address the organ shortage crisis
affecting New York citizens. Enacting a program of financial
incentives would be a desirable and effective way to fulfill the
legislature’s responsibility to protect the public health of New
Yorkers.224
Thus far New York has been slow to adopt its own incentive
program for organ donations. Although some insurance incentive
does exist for organ donors not covered by Medicaid225 and
(Gerald Benjamin ed. 1994).
221
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3.
222
Benjamin, supra note 220, at 235.
223
Id. at 232.
224
The Supreme Court has stated that it is the right and even duty of the
state to take steps to protect the safety and health of the public. See, e.g., Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510, 523 (1934) (citing Justice Barbour’s statement
that “it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to
advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be
conducive to these ends” ).
225
See MED-MANUAL, MEDICAID-NY §2.2.8.5 (reimbursing non-Medicaid
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legislation was recently passed to reward donors and their families
with a medal of honor,226 these represent only modest steps to
encourage organ donation. New York has not created any
legislation which resembles the more innovative changes made on
the federal level and in the state of Pennsylvania to proactively
deal with this frightening organ shortage crisis. Given the severity
of the crisis, the models established by Congress and some state
governments, and the language and intent of the current ban on
organ transaction in the state, it is time for New York to become
more proactive in stemming the crisis and develop a financial
incentive program of its own.
VI. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO NEW YORK’S ORGAN SHORTAGE
CRISIS
Since the organ shortage is primarily due to low consent rates
and not to a shortage of people dying with suitable organs,227 the
efficacy of any program to adequately deal with the shortage
would revolve primarily around the simple task of getting more
people to consent to donate their organs upon their deaths. Studies
indicate that Americans generally have a positive attitude toward
organ donation and financial incentives.228 Thus, a program which
would increase both the opportunities and the motivation for
individuals to donate their organs would represent the best hope of
increasing organ donation in New York. Therefore, this Note
proposes that New York adopt a set of guidelines, similar to those
of the AMA,229 combined with a model similar to the one created
in Pennsylvania, in initiating a new financial incentive program to
covered donors donating to a Medicaid eligible recipient).
226
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4368 (Supp. 2004) (establishing a medal
of honor “to be awarded annually to honor the memory of all individual organ
donors or the gifts of donor families”).
227
Reed, supra note 3. See also supra Part II.A. (citing statistics from the
New York Organ Donor Network that New Yorkers fall below the national
consent rate).
228
Supra note 162 and accompanying text.
229
See supra Part IV.A.2.c.

FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC

370

4/18/2006 1:07 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

encourage organ donation. This type of program would provide
New Yorkers with both an increased opportunity and a financial
motivation to consent to donate while still keeping within the limit
of what is deemed to be ethically responsible and morally
tolerable.
A. Guidelines of the Program
The guidelines for the proposed program in New York to
increase the number of available organs for transplants should be
adopted from the AMA’s recent proposal regarding future
contracts for cadaveric organ donors.230 These guidelines are
inventive yet conservative, allowing for adequate initiative while
still being moderate enough to avoid offending the public’s ethical
and moral sensibilities.
The AMA’s proposed pilot program suggests several
regulatory safeguards,231 the purpose of which are to ensure both
that “the health of donors and recipients is in no way jeopardized”
and that the “quality of the organ supply is not degraded.”232 The
AMA further suggests that incentives be offered by way of a
“futures contract,” whereby a competent adult prospective donor
can agree to donate his or her organs after death in exchange for a
state agency’s agreement to give some financial remuneration to
the donor’s family or estate after the organs have been retrieved
and judged medically suitable for transplantation.233 The AMA
includes other conditions under the “contract,” such as limiting the
program to cadaveric donor organ transplantation as opposed to
living donor organ transplantation,234 limiting the option to the
prospective donor, not to his or her family or a third party,235 and
restricting the application of this program to organ procurement,
230

American Medical Association, supra note 189.
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. It should be noted that the AMA does not specify any preference of
type of remuneration—direct or indirect.
234
Id.
235
American Medical Association, supra note 189.
231
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not to allocation or distribution.236 Perhaps most importantly, the
proposal stipulates that “[A]ny incentive should be of moderate
value and should be the lowest amount that can reasonably be
expected to encourage organ donation.”237 Following this
provision of the AMA guidelines would render the $10,000 tax
deduction, adopted in Wisconsin238 to be too excessive. However,
the $300 offered to Pennsylvanians who consent to donate their
organs would be appropriate. The AMA further suggests that a
state agency be designated to administer the incentive and exert
full control over it to maintain the level of incentive.239
B. Details of the Program
With regard to the details of this program, this Note suggests
that New York follow the example set by Pennsylvania’s program.
Through slight modifications of existing state motor vehicle and
tax forms, the State will find itself with both the monetary
resources it needs to offer compensation to potential donors and
the number of organs it needs to adequately address the existing
shortage it faces.
1. Existing and Pending Relevant Legislation
Much of the legislation needed for this program is already in
place or pending. New York driver license applications240 already
contain a section where the applicant may check off a box to
authorize the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to send the
applicant’s information to the Department of Health for inclusion
in the Organ/Tissue Donor Registry.241 In addition, in February of
236

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
238
See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
239
American Medical Association, supra note 189.
240
New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Application for Drivers
License or Non-Driver ID Card 1, available at http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/
forms/mv44.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
241
Id.
237
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2004, New York created its own trust fund for organ donation.242
Another recently enacted law directs the DMV commissioner to
develop license application and renewal forms that solicit a
voluntary one dollar donation from persons applying for or
renewing a driver’s license at the time of such application or
renewal, with the money collected deposited in the “Life – Pass It
On” Trust Fund, an organ donation trust fund.243 Finally, New
York State Resident Tax Forms contain a section for “voluntary
gift/contributions” where the filer may contribute to such causes as
the Breast Cancer Research Fund, Return a Gift to Wildlife, the
Alzheimer’s Fund, and others.244 Although the organ donation trust
fund is not currently one of the options, a bill exists to include an
additional box where a taxpayer may “check off” to make
monetary contributions to the organ donation trust fund.245
a. Modifying Existing Forms
Under the proposed program, four forms will be modified to
contain the option for the applicant to be included in the
Organ/Tissue Donor Registry, like the one contained on the driver
license application, and to make minimal contributions to the organ
donation trust fund. The four forms are: 1) The driver license
applications; 2) New York’s Vehicle Registration Application
Form;246 3) New York’s on-line vehicle registration renewal

242
243
244

See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 508-5 (Supp. 2004).
New York State Resident Income Tax Return (Form IT-201) 2, section

56.
245

See New York State Assembly Bill Summary A06692, available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06692 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). The bill,
titled “An act to amend the tax law, in relation to providing a tax check off box
on personal income tax return forms for the life pass it on trust fund” was last
delivered to the Senate on June 6, 2005. Id.
246
See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, VEHICLE
REGISTRATION/TITLE APPLICATION, available at http://www.nydmv.state.
ny.us/forms/mv82.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
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application;247 and 4) The New York State Resident Tax Forms.
By including these options on all four of these forms, New York
will guarantee that the options for organ donation will be presented
to a large percentage of its citizens on a regular basis. For example,
as of the end of 2004, there were 10,449,816 registered vehicles in
New York State.248 The estimated total population of New York
State at the end of 2004 was 19,227,088.249 This means that from
the vehicle renewal applications alone, approximately 54% of the
population of the state of New York will be presented with the
option to donate organs and make contributions to the fund every
time they renew their vehicle registration.250
b. Required Response Format
Finally, the request to donate, which will appear on the official
state forms, must be presented as a “yes” or “no” question.251
Applicants will be presented with the question, “Do you consent to
make an anatomical gift to be effective upon your death?” Thus
formatted, applicants will be forced to consider the question and
answer it. The question cannot be overlooked or ignored when
completing the form.252 This option would further serve as the
“futures contract” suggested by the AMA. Furthermore, adding
247

The registrations for certain vehicles can currently be renewed on-line at
NEW YORK STATE DMV, INTERNAL OFFICE TRANSACTIONS, http://
www.nydmv.state.ny.us/renew/default.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
248
NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATISTICS, VEHICLE
REGISTRATIONS IN FORCE 2004, available at http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/
Statistics/regin03.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
249
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW YORK QUICK FACTS, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ states/36000.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
250
This rough estimate does not take into account the numbers of people
who have registered multiple vehicles.
251
This strategy was suggested by Dr. Veatch in an earlier article he wrote.
See Robert M. Veatch, Routine Inquiry About Organ Donation – an Alternative
to Presumed Consent, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 17, 1246-49 (1991), cited in
Veatch, supra note 149, at 32.
252
These types of questions already appear on many computer based
interactive forms where certain fields must be filled in to complete the form.
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these sections to these forms would raise funds to finance the
incentive program and will solicit donations of organs on a regular
basis.
2. Incentives Offered
In addition, while some percentage of the proceeds from the
fund will go towards increasing education and awareness of organ
donation, another percentage of the proceeds from the fund in the
proposed program will be directed towards a donor incentive
program to pay for the expenses of prospective donors. Just as in
Pennsylvania,253 the financial incentives to New Yorkers in
exchange for consent to donate organs upon death would be
indirect, such as payments for reasonable hospital bills, travel and
funeral expenses, and other incidental expenses incurred by and
related to the donation itself. These incentives would be the
“financial remuneration” suggested by the AMA. The
remuneration would be adequate motivation to encourage
donation254 while avoiding the many moral pitfalls associated with
direct financial incentives, such as association with
commodification of organs.
The amount of incentive would also be modest, so as not to
offend any moral sensitivities people might have toward the
exchange of money for human organs. As the AMA suggests, only
incentives of “moderate value” should be offered.255 In addition,
the legislative history of Section 4307 of New York’s Public
Health Law implies that expenses such as travel or
accommodations are not to be included in the definition of
“valuable consideration.”256 To determine what the value should
be, New York257 can follow the Pennsylvania model ($300), or
253

See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
See Evans, supra note 66, at 1025.
255
Supra Part IV.A.2.c.
256
Supra Part V.B. (citing the fear of the New York Legislature of creating
“widespread medical prostitution”).
257
The state agency that should be in charge of this program is the
Department of Health, a department experienced in dealing with medical, health,
254
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calculate its own figure which it deems to be the “lowest amount
that can reasonably be expected to encourage organ donation.”258
Thus, the legislative framework for this proposal is already in
place. Slightly amending existing and pending legislation, and
modifying existing state forms, should not be a difficult
undertaking. These changes, while small in substance, will be a
significant step for New York and its citizens to resolve the current
transplantable organ deficiency. The proposed program will be the
first steps to finally alleviating a crisis that looms large for many
citizens of the state and for their families. The new program’s
import should not be underestimated and its necessity should not
be overlooked.
VII. CONCLUSION
Each day that goes by, more people are added to an organ
waiting list and more people die waiting on that list. Individuals
suffering from organ failure and their families must cope with their
sickness, knowing that the technology and resources now exist to
save them. The one obstacle is connecting the resources to the
demand. An effective solution is already in place in Pennsylvania.
It is incumbent upon the legislators of New York to create its own
solution that would most effectively work towards solving this
grave problem. The means exist; it is now up to the legislators to
provide a method that could possibly save thousands of lives in
their state and put an end to this horrific crisis.

and safety matters, which would qualify it as the most adept at deciding crucial
issues involved in allocating financial incentives for organ donations.
258
See American Medical Association Guidelines, supra note 189, at
(2)(c).

